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There is a widespread perception that it is becoming increasingly dangerous for 
humanitarian workers to provide assistance in conflict and post-conflict settings.  
In some cases this may be due to their proximity to and cooperation with 
traditional military forces operating in these zones.  In other cases it may be due 
to misperceptions by belligerents about the relationships between military and 
humanitarian actors.  In still other cases due to the well-publicized success that 
belligerents’ attacks have had in disrupting the stabilization and reconstruction 
processes in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Diversity of opinion, policy, motivation and operational practice among 
humanitarian actors makes it impossible to settle on a single, unified course of 
action to remedy this situation.  However, familiarity and discussion among 
organizations improves their appreciation of each other’s activities, thus 
enhancing the ultimate goal of providing humanitarian assistance to civilian 
populations living in insecure environments. 
 
Against this backdrop, workshop participants developed the following findings 
and recommendations: 
 
• Major differences exist in the desired relationships between non- 
governmental organizations/international organizations (NGO/IOs) and 
the military.  The military generally wants closer cooperation, while 
NGO/IOs want clearly defined roles and obvious demarcations between 
different humanitarian and military organizations/operations. 
 
• There is a critical need for clear, widely accepted operational definitions 
for commonly used terms such as “humanitarian space,” “humanitarian 
actors” and “security.” 
 
• Dialogue among actors in the field of humanitarian assistance is critical, as 
it increases familiarity and understanding between organizations and 
provides a forum in which to craft and agree on acceptable definitions. 
 
• Government policymakers need to establish a regular process for 
integrating NGO/IO input into plans for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance pre-, during and post-conflict. 
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• The DoD should incorporate existing operational guidelines for 
humanitarian assistance, such as those developed by UNOCHA, into 
future military operations. 
 
 




This is the final report summarizing discussions at the workshop on 
"Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments."  It details challenges and issues 
faced by NGO/IOs, armed forces, and governments as they attempt to operate 
along side each other in stabilization and reconstruction operations in conflict 
and post-conflict zones. 
 
The workshop was held on 13-14 January 2005 with representatives from five 
non-governmental humanitarian organizations, two international organizations, 
three academic institutions and four US Government agencies and departments.  
There were a total of 30 participants from these various organizations.  The goal 
was to keep the overall group small enough to facilitate frank discussions. 
 
California State University Monterey Bay, the Center for Humanitarian 
Cooperation, the International Medical Corps, the International Rescue 
Committee, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and the Naval 
Postgraduate School sponsored the workshop.  It was hosted by the United 
States Institute of Peace (1200 17th Street, NW, Washington, DC.)  The conference 
was funded by the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies at the 
Naval Postgraduate School and by the US Institute of Peace. 
 
The workshop was developed by California State University Monterey Bay, the 
Monterey Institute for International Studies and the Naval Postgraduate School 
as a way for NGO/IO actors and their government counterparts involved in 
complex humanitarian emergencies to identify common concerns and propose 
ways of dealing with them.  The three educational institutions also plan to 
develop new education and training programs that will be of use to NGO/IO 
staff involved in these issues. 
 
Structure of the Report 
 
This report is divided into four major sections:  survey discussion and results, 
day one discussions and conclusions, day two breakout group discussions and 
presentations, and conclusions and recommendations.  Some topics and issues 
appear frequently.  This is because the survey, the workshop discussions and the 
breakout groups focused on a set of commonly defined key issues.  Many of 
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Survey Description and Results1 
 
In preparation for the workshop, Professors Karen Guttieri of the Naval 
Postgraduate School and Miguel Tirado of California State University Monterey 
Bay prepared a survey to identify and map the relationships between actors 
involved in providing humanitarian assistance in conflict and post-conflict 
settings (See Appendix II: Workshop Survey).  The survey was distributed to the 
non-governmental organizations, international organizations and governmental, 
military and academic professionals who were invited to participate in the 
workshop discussions.  Of the 22 surveys distributed, 20 were returned.  This 
small survey was not intended as a scientific instrument, but its results were 
used as a point of departure for discussions between workshop participants. 
 
The survey examined the most pressing challenges/concerns facing 
organizations in post-conflict and relief settings.  Three challenges were at the 
top of nearly every response: 
 
• Security for personnel 
• Information sharing 
• Local public awareness 
 
In discussing the security challenges facing personnel, respondents voiced 
concern over the “blurring of lines” between humanitarian actors on the one 
hand and political and military actors on the other.  The identity and 
relationships between actors in conflict and post-conflict settings can quite 
literally mean life or death for the individuals involved on the ground.  Many 
NGO/IOs that specialize in providing aid in such environments frequently 
depend on images of neutrality and impartiality to do so.  If interaction with 
military forces compromises this image of neutrality, many respondents believe 
it is possible that they will no longer be viewed as independent actors, thus 
becoming legitimate targets in the eyes of some combatants.  This perception has 
been highlighted by recent attacks against United Nations and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and by the 
assassination of Margaret Hassan, director of Care International’s operations in 
Iraq. 
 
                                                 
1 This section on survey results draws heavily from a paper entitled “Humanitarian Roles in Insecure 
Environments: Response to a Survey” presented by Dr. Karen Guttieri (Guttieri@nps.edu) of the Naval 
Postgraduate School at the conference. 
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It is noteworthy that communications and information sharing were prominent 
concerns of almost everyone who responded to the survey.  One participant 
remarked that “better clarity and [a] more systematic and focused effort to 
communicate purpose by all organizations operating in an emergency can help 
improve collaboration without abrogating the organizations’ key principles or 
protocols.” 
 
Other prominently mentioned concerns were staff recruiting and training, donor 
issues (particularly US Government expectations), program monitoring and 
evaluation, and logistical and communications barriers to cooperation. 
 
Seeking to better understand relationships between organizations in the field, the 
survey asked participants to identify their current levels of interaction with other 
types of actors as well as their desired levels of such interaction with these actors. 
 
It appears from the responses that NGO workers are encountering the military 
more frequently and intimately than desired, while the military finds itself 
expected to perform humanitarian and reconstruction activities that it is 
unprepared for and that it would rather pass on to other organizations. 
 
Participants were asked to provide their responses according to the following 
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Type of Interaction Description 
Conflictive  Unproductive disputes 
Dismissive  The other party or actor discounts your role 
Awareness  Cognizant of each other’s presence in field 
Familiarity  Knowledgeable of the others’ activities and     
 methods 
Boundary setting  Mutually clarify parameters of operation to avoid  
 disruption of one another’s missions 
Cooperative  Mutual accommodation for separate missions,  
 Including information exchange 
Collaborative  Distinct operating teams / work toward common  
 outcome based on shared situational  
 understanding 
Partnering  Mix operational units / work toward a common    
 goal 
 
Survey respondents included nine non-governmental organizations.  They were 
asked to describe the character and quality of their interactions with other 
organizations in the field of humanitarian assistance as well as what type of 
interaction they desire (shown in the middle column in brackets).   
 




With Whom Current Interaction 
[Desired Interaction] 
Quality 
IO Collaborative-partnering High 
Local NGO Cooperative High 
Int’l NGO Cooperative 
[collaborative] 
Medium 
Local Authorities Boundary setting 
[cooperative] 
Medium 
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In contrast, US Government and military responses were more sanguine, as 
follows: 
 
US Government and Military Interactions 
 
With Whom Current Interaction 
[Desired Interaction] 
Quality 
IO Cooperative-partnering Medium-High 
Local NGO Cooperative Medium 
Int’l NGO Cooperative Medium-Low 
Local Authorities Cooperative Medium 
Contractors Familiarity – cooperative Medium 
 
Many NGO/IOs noted how critical host country perceptions are to the success of 
their work.  “Without strong local bonds and buy-in from the community, our 
work is not tenable,” wrote one participant.  “Security is a major concern when 
perception is incorrect,” wrote another.  One participant wrote, “The military is 
dismissive of NGOs and [is] delving ever deeper into humanitarian 
programming.  The US Government is obsessed with owning the NGOs through 
rhetoric (‘force multipliers’), actions (contracts vs. grants…), and sanctions 
(prohibiting even emergency humanitarian assistance through OFAC licensing).” 
 
For its part, respondents from the US Department of Defense highlighted a 
difference between conflict and permissive environments.  Within conflict zones, 
they expressed a desire to transition away from humanitarian operations as soon 
as other organizations are in a position to lead humanitarian activities.  Within 
permissive environments, respondents indicated that DoD’s preferred role 
depends largely on a host nation’s desires and approval, as its stated goal is to 
participate/operate only “with the approval of host nation authorities.” 
 
Civilian government agencies likewise seek to “work closely with and empower, 
if possible, local communities.”  The need to manage tensions between 
humanitarian workers and armed forces conducting peacekeeping duties was 
noted by many government officials, highlighting a major challenge faced in 
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Workshop Discussions:  Day One   
 
The workshop opened with a short presentation of the survey results described 
above.  Common trends were highlighted, as were the differences in approaches, 
preferences and perspectives of the various actors involved in delivering 






Members of the International Committee of the  
Red Cross and Australian military officers 
 




Workshop discussions largely focused on the relationships among actors 
providing humanitarian assistance in conflict and post-conflict settings, namely 
NGOs, IOs and armed forces.  While these actors come into frequent contact with 
one another, there are significant differences in their fundamental operational 
guidelines, mandates and objectives.  These differences often generate 
misperceptions and confusion among actors in the field, and pose major 
challenges to the goals of stabilization and reconstruction.  (It is important to 
note that, even within a particular organizational category (NGOs, for example), 
there are vast differences in perspective and delivery methods.) 
 
An important operational weakness that was immediately recognized is the need 
for a clear definition of roles for the various actors involved as well as a clear 
definition of “humanitarian assistance” (as opposed to humanitarian relief, 
development, etc.).  Many noted that “such definitions are critical if we are to 
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have a comprehensive understanding of who is doing what, how, and for what 
reasons.” 
 
Another major problem that was addressed at the outset is the lack of 
interaction/communication between the various actors involved in providing 
humanitarian assistance prior to implementation in the field.  This lack of prior 
communication, coupled with the lack of clear understanding of operational 
roles cited above, frequently results in situations in which members of the 
various organizations meet for the first time on the ground, “learning while 
doing” in the process of administering aid. 
 
It was pointed out that this is not necessarily bad, and that “success ultimately 
depends on the personality and experience of the operators on the ground.”  
Further, it was noted that increased familiarity might not necessarily create a 
smoother working relationship. 
 
The discussion on interaction and communication then moved to the desirability 
of enhanced interaction, and perhaps even collaboration, with some promoting 
the possibility of joint training exercises taking place prior to deployment.  While 
there was a diverse range of opinion on this issue, the discussion generally 
confirmed the findings of the survey:  the military wants more cooperation with 
NGO/IOs, while the NGO/IOs want clearly defined roles with distinct 
operations for the separate actors in the field.  Highlighting the diversity of the 
group, some NGO/IOs said that they would like increased interaction with 
military forces, while others declined to consider such a possibility even if the 
military force was part of a UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operation.  One 
participant asked, “Why should there be common operations or training 
exercises when the ultimate objectives of our organizations are different?” 
 
At this point participants identified a critical difference in functional versus 
motivational relationships.  While the discussions had previously focused on the 
functional relationships between actors involved in humanitarian actions, it was 
noted that there are also major differences in what motivates different actors to 
become involved in specific complex humanitarian emergencies.  Put simply, 
“Why are these actors involved in providing humanitarian assistance in 
particular settings?” 
 
A significant motivational factor causing military forces to get involved in 
humanitarian assistance is the legal requirement for occupying forces to provide 
for civilian populations living in conflict zones, as outlined in International 
Humanitarian Law.  Despite this requirement, there are often major gaps in the 
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ability of military forces to provide for civilians.  Another motivational factor for 
military forces is the belief that humanitarian assistance enhances force 
protection and helps to win the “hearts and minds” of the people.  In either case, 
today’s post-conflict requirements extend beyond providing food and medical 
care.  External actors are expected to assist in transitions to democracy, manage 
prison and legal systems, promote economic development, and create an active, 
effective civil society.  NGO/IOs usually play lead roles in filling these gaps—
provided they can safely operate within the territory in question. 
 
At this point in the discussion it was again noted that there is a need for clearly 
defined roles for all actors, and that these definitions need to include pre-, during 
and post-conflict activities.  It was generally agreed that such definitions are 
critical to the ability to effectively provide assistance. 
 
Many participants agreed with the statement that “the crux of managing civil-
military relations is to manage expectations.” 
 
Related to this, several participants noted that within NGO/IOs there is 
frequently a disconnect between senior management and operators in the field.  
This disconnect can take many forms, but ultimately managers have to 
understand the realities of the situation on the ground and be prepared to deal 
with them effectively. 
 
It was also noted that collaboration can include discussion and dialogue, 
meaning that actors can agree to disagree.  “Democracy, for example,” noted one 
participant, “is collaboration, but doesn’t necessarily mean that we like each 
other.” 
 
Another participant noted that it is important to recognize that relationships, 
interests, governments, and situations on the ground can change.  Thus, 
participants agreed that it is critical to continue and enhance dialogue among the 
actors so that everyone has a sense of what changes are taking place and how the 
various organizations can adapt in order to best accomplish their goals.  
Additionally, stated one participant, “We have to accept that we do not always 
get what we want.”  Different organizations have different mandates, and “we 
all have to fulfill our obligations regardless of what we would like to do, or how 
we would like to do it.” 
 
Confirming and expanding on the survey responses, some NGO/IO participants 
expressed concern about working with the US military now that the US is so 
focused on the Global War on Terror.  To some NGO/IO participants, this focus 
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casts the US in the role of a belligerent.  Without clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities, both in policy and on the ground in operational settings, some 
NGOs believed that collaboration could easily lead to guilt by association and 
thus pose a significant security threat.  Essentially, some NGO participants 
believed that their image of neutrality could be damaged. 
 
In summary, it is clear that well-defined relationships between actors engaged in 
humanitarian actions are critical to successfully providing for civilian 
populations living in conflict zones.  However, it is equally clear that there is 
such a broad range of opinions and policy positions on acceptable forms of 
interaction between actors that it is impossible to make definitive statements 










The International Medical Corps providing 
humanitarian assistance in Macedonia, 1999 
 
Photo:  International Medical Corps/Danny Hoffman 
 
II. Humanitarian Space 
 
Drawing directly from a question in the survey, the basic concept of humanitarian 
space was a central theme of workshop discussions. This issue came up 
repeatedly.  Workshop participants generally defined humanitarian space as a 
“safe and secure environment in which to provide impartial assistance and 
protection,” while noting that such spaces are perceived to be increasingly 
unsafe.  NGO participants consider impartiality, neutrality, non-discrimination 
and independence from political and military organizations essential to 
maintaining security.  However, this model may not be holding.  As one 
participant expressed, NGOs have themselves become prime targets due to their 
proximity to the conflict.    
 
Another aspect of the discussions focused on the issue of neutrality and whether 
NGO/IOs can truly claim to be neutral.  It was pointed out that when a 
government invites an NGO/IO into a country, it has a purpose for doing so--
and this purpose is political.  In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban used 
external NGOs as a “force multiplier,” relying on them to provide for the basic 
needs of the population, thus allowing the Taliban itself to focus on specific 
goals, such as the implementation of Islamic Law. 
 
Similarly, one participant asked about the ability of local NGOs to be neutral in 
post-conflict environments.  Another responded, “No, local NGOs cannot be 
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neutral in such situations, but at the same time they best know how to proceed 
within that particular society.  Thus their participation can greatly enhance 
humanitarian efforts.” 
 
States have a sovereign duty to meet the humanitarian needs of their 
populations, and occupying forces have a similar legal duty to meet the needs of 
local populations.  The nations of the world, noted one NGO representative, have 
come up with these mandates, which justify the existence and operations of (at 
least some) humanitarian organizations.   
 
In response, another participant commented that “NGOs are established around 
a series of values; thus they are not neutral—which should be viewed as a good 
thing.”  The important factor is the impact of NGO/IO activities on the 
beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance (i.e., on the populace in need) not on the 
interests of particular political powers. 
 
Many NGO representatives acknowledged that while they have their own 
particular agendas, they do not consider themselves to be “partisan.”  One NGO 
representative noted that “My organization gets funding from so many sources 
that it does not consider itself to be promoting the specific policy goal of any one 
donor.”  Instead, it is doing what it considers to be “good work,” providing for 
the basic needs of civilian populations.  By some definitions this may not make 
them neutral, but it does not make them bad.  “Intent,” noted one participant, 
“does matter.” 
 
This was countered with the argument that what may be considered a neutral act 
by one could be viewed as a threat by another.  For example, even something as 
seemingly impartial and innocent as a census can pose a real threat for a 
particular demographic group.  Further, many NGO/IOs do what they think is 
right without consulting the local communities in which they are operating. 
 
“Our organizations are the people in them,” one participant asserted, “and that 
generally means that they are white, Christian, alcohol-drinking, sexually active 
males, a group clearly seen as a threat in some societies.”  The participant went 
on to state that the obvious solution is to incorporate more locals into multi-
national NGOs—at all levels of implementation, from managing and 
implementing programs on the ground to executive decision making in senior 
management.  This would help improve multinational NGO/IOs’ image of 
neutrality, which in turn could help with the growing security challenges they 
face.   
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In response, another participant countered that in some cases the threat comes 
not from the nature of the humanitarian organizations, but from the recipient 
societies themselves.  In some societies, the participant asserted, all outsiders are 
viewed suspiciously, regardless of their demographic make up, activities, or 
ultimate goals. 
 
Again, the importance of having clear role definitions was raised.  In many 
instances, argued one participant, “humanitarian assistance” is used much too 
broadly.  There are real differences between humanitarian assistance, relief and 
development, and these differences have to be recognized and taken into 
account. 
 
Further, NGO/IOs with different missions face different security challenges.  For 
example, organizations that address immediate humanitarian assistance face 
different challenges from those faced by organizations focused on shaping 
society.  The timelines that NGO/IOs with varying roles work under also have a 
big impact on the kinds of difficulties they face. 
 
Humanitarian assistance is a “growth industry,” with more organizations and 
individuals involved in providing humanitarian assistance in more locations 
around the world than at any time in history.  Thus, with more providers on the 
ground, it is natural there will be an increase in the number of threats or attacks 
made against them.  Despite this trend, however, participants felt that the 
increased threat levels are real, pointing to tactics successfully used by insurgents 











Traffic control near Mosul, Iraq 
 
Photo:  US Department of Defense 
 
III. Establishing a Secure Environment 
 
At times, discussions about humanitarian space blended into broader discussions 
about general security, with clear differences as to how civilian and military 
participants define “secure environments” in complex humanitarian 
emergencies.  Discussions confirmed the survey findings that military actors 
tend to place more emphasis on “national” security, “public” security and force 
protection, while NGO/IOs tend to place more emphasis on “human” or 
noncombatant security--on secure environments in which their beneficiaries can 
access humanitarian services and in which their personnel can safely administer 
aid. 
 
The discussion began with the assertion that the military’s role in an insecure 
environment is to provide the security necessary for the society to rebuild.  “This 
is what people expect of them, and this, not humanitarian assistance,” asserted 
one participant, “is what they (military forces) should focus on.”  It was pointed 
out that there is a “Catch-22”:  security is difficult to achieve without at least 
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It was again suggested, in response, that “It comes down to managing 
expectations.”  What is meant by security?  Is it 100 percent security, 100 percent 
of the time?  Is it quick reactions to security threats, or something else?  One clear 
challenge in reaching group consensus on this issue is that there are so many 
levels of conflict, from macro to micro, some requiring military forces, others 
police forces. 
 
There was general agreement, however, that the first few months of post-conflict 
reconstruction are critical.  “The point of viable peace,” suggested one 
participant, “is (within) the first three months of reconstruction.”  After that 
point, recurring violence becomes increasingly likely. 
 
The issue of conflict prevention was raised as well.  Stability and reconstruction 
efforts do not have to wait until after hostilities have broken out.  They can, and 
should, be employed before a conflict begins, one participant stressed.  Indeed, 
“War begins when diplomacy fails,” voiced another. 
 
The need for clear definitions and roles was emphasized again and again. 
 
There are significant differences in perceptions regarding security, and different 
mechanisms employed to achieve it.  One participant cited a recent UN report in 
which researchers asked UN employees working in Afghanistan to identify the 
regions in the country they considered insecure.  Their perceptions of insecurity 
were compared with responses from indigenous Afghans, and were found to be 
diametrically opposed.  The regions that the UN employees considered unsafe 
were regarded as secure by the local populations, while locals identified regions 
considered safest by the UN employees as the most dangerous. 
 
It was noted that NGO/IOs depend on images of neutrality, impartiality and 
transparency in the minds of local populations to ensure their security.  Military 
forces operate entirely differently, depending on images of power and strength 
to deter potential threats.  The challenge, according to some, is integrating these 
two radically different systems into one operational mission with a common 
objective but different operational guidelines. 
 
One participant expressed the opinion that if local populations are safe, 
NGO/IOs on the ground will be safe as well.  A major challenge here is that 
there are often more than two sides to a conflict; and in some cases there are 
many different parties involved, each with different goals, guidelines, mandates 
and perceptions of security and neutrality. 
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Again, the changing nature of US foreign policy as a result of the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks and recent events in Iraq was noted.  Within the US 
Government there is an increasing awareness and acceptance of the idea that in 
conflict zones success is about more than winning the war; it is also about 
winning the peace.  There is growing recognition that the larger battle is for 
“hearts and minds,” resulting in a greater emphasis being placed on “human 
security,” stabilization and reconstruction.  The battleground is becoming 
increasingly viewed as psychological rather than physical.  At the same time, one 
participant noted, physical-security voids in some regions necessitate a strong 
military presence before such psychological and humanitarian aid can be 
delivered. 
 
This poses a huge challenge because military personnel are generally not trained 
for such missions.  They are frequently assigned such tasks simply because they 
have the funding and technical capability to carry them out, and because civilian 
policymakers do not know what other government agency to turn to.  “This is 
not,” one participant suggested, “(just) a problem within the US military.  It is a 










The US military has the capability to provide 
significant humanitarian assistance in the 
face of complex humanitarian emergencies 
 
Photo:   US Department of Defense 
 
IV. Providing Assistance 
 
Despite reluctance on the part of the military to get involved in providing 
humanitarian assistance, the reality is that when it comes to actually delivering 
aid, the military is much better equipped than NGO/IOs.  As one participant put 
it, NGOs simply cannot mobilize aid on the same scale as the military. 
 
Specifically, the military’s command of communications, logistics and 
transportation were cited as critical to its ability to provide timely, large-scale 
humanitarian assistance. 
 
Adding to this, one participant noted that, “given the power and funding of the 
US military, it is quite likely that it will be involved in providing humanitarian 
assistance far into the future.”  Therefore, the participant suggested, “it is 
important to have increased education, communication and potential 
collaboration between the military and NGOs prior to future deployments.” 
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Supporting the suggestion that there should be increased cooperation between 
NGO/IOs and the military, another participant asserted that clear 
understandings are needed of who can and will do what, and systems need to be 
in place to respond to humanitarian emergencies.  “How often does the message 
have to be repeated and the lessons re-learned?” the participant asked.  “A 
process has to be established and systematized, a system that we got close to in 
Bosnia when there was a UN advisor involved in military trainings.”  Continuing 
this theme, another participant agreed that “Just-in-time training is no good.  We 
need more interagency cooperation.  The military can do ad hoc (humanitarian 
response) all right because of its infrastructure and well-developed institutions, 
but most NGOs simply cannot.”  “Ad hockery,” noted another, “leads to reaction 
rather than proactive planning.” 
 
In response, another participant noted that many NGO/IOs are becoming 
increasingly well organized and prepared for humanitarian crises. 
 
A major problem for both military and governmental agencies, one participant 
mentioned, is a tendency on the part of US policymakers to anticipate and plan 
around “best possible” scenarios where, in fact, situations are often far more 
challenging. 
 
Most militaries place a high priority on training personnel in order to assure a 
high performance standard.  NGO/IOs, it was suggested, should solicit funding 
to promote training for their own personnel. 
 
Some argued that NGO/IOs operate much better in non-conflict settings—as 
demonstrated by relief efforts following the recent tsunami that struck South and 
Southeast Asia.  Interestingly, others cited this same example to counter that the 
military is much better at providing humanitarian assistance in non-conflict 
zones. 
 
At this point participants were reminded again that definitions are important, 
and that many situations labeled “humanitarian assistance” are, in fact, not.  
Another participant, though agreeing the term is used too broadly, warned 
against the group coming up with its own definitions “here and now.”   
 
The pre- and post-9/11 dividing line was raised again, with the comment that 
before September 11, 2001, the US Defense Department wanted as much as 
possible to outsource humanitarian assistance to other agencies (e.g., USAID), 
but now recognizes that it sometimes has to be involved in such assistance 
activities. 
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A complicating factor in providing assistance in conflict zones, noted one 
participant, is that combat, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities 
are all taking place at the same time--creating a need for simultaneous 
operations, with all of the challenges associated therein.   
 
The increasing role played by private contracting companies was briefly 
discussed, with one participant noting that contractors are encroaching on the 
role traditionally played by NGO/IOs--but are motivated by profit as the reason 












Civil-Military Cooperation in the wake of the Asian tsunami 
 
Photo:   US Department of Defense 
 
V. Coordination and Information Sharing 
 
The discussion about providing assistance evolved into discussions about and 
suggestions for coordination and information sharing. 
 
While some participants stressed the need for and desirability of increased 
cooperation, coordination and information sharing, others maintained that there 
should not be closer ties between humanitarian actors and military forces. 
 
There are well developed standards for cooperation, coordination and 
information sharing used by some humanitarian actors, and participants urged 
that these standards be discussed, distributed and adopted by all organizations 
participating in the delivery of humanitarian assistance—including NGO/IOs 
and military forces.  It was further noted that while it is important for 
organizations delivering aid to abide by these standards, it is equally important 
for donors to be aware of them and to direct funding to the organizations that 
abide by them. 
 
One participant noted that there are currently over 800 NGOs operating in 
Afghanistan, which, it was asserted, is simply too many.  Under such 
circumstances, the participant argued, the diversity of actors with different goals, 
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guidelines and operational methods creates a situation of confusion and, 
ultimately, insecurity.  A certification process based on specific standards—to 
include local participation, motivations and delivery methods--would facilitate 
coordinating and improving both the delivery of services and security for the 
individuals involved in providing them. 
 
Agreeing, another participant stated, “It is not enough simply to have the ability 
to deliver humanitarian assistance; there must also be a certain level of quality 
control.” 
 
Taking issue with the idea of standards and certification, one participant noted 
that NGO/IOs are made up of diverse individuals operating under a range of 
motivations, and that they are not “standard.” 
 
While this may be true, countered another participant, there are still advantages 
to adopting certain codes of conduct for NGO/IOs operating in specific 
situations.  For example, there could be certain codes for a particular country, or 
codes of conduct for operating in conflict zones.  Again, these standards could 
improve the quality of services provided and help to improve the image of the 
NGO/IO community, which could, in turn, positively affect NGO/IO security 
concerns. 
 
Another participant, noting that the discussion was focusing almost exclusively 
on NGO/IOs, asked how it could be applied to the military?  In response, it was 
suggested that military forces involved in providing humanitarian assistance 
could adopt many of the standards used by NGOs.  Further, stated another 
participant, NGO/IO guidelines could help the military understand who its 
potential partners are and how they operate. 
 
Returning to the issue of funding, a concern was raised over unrestricted funding 
versus money earmarked for specific objectives—such as tsunami relief—once 
again highlighting the importance of donor cooperation in any attempts at 
standardization.      
 
This sparked discussion on peacekeeping and policing activities, and on the 
value and feasibility of coordination in this area.  Conflict prevention was cited 
as a critical component of stabilization as well as an opportunity for 
collaboration.  It was suggested, for example, that the US Government could help 
the African Union with policing efforts in the Darfur region of Sudan.  There was 
general agreement that it would be feasible and beneficial to establish a policing 
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curriculum, with joint training exercises and clearly defined and established 
partners, including indigenous staff. 
 
If NGO/IO representatives are included in crisis-response training, stated one 
participant, when a crisis hits, they can more realistically be expected to take the 
lead in dealing with it. 
 
Another participant responded, “Yes, but all of this—operational standards and 
closer cooperation—is already widely recognized as being important.  Just look 
at the initiatives already developed.  These ideas are not new, nor are they 
implemented.  Why not, and how can we convince people to implement them 
now?  What’s changed?” 
 
World views and realities are quickly changing in the post-cold war, post-9/11 
world.  In 2001, the independent International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, responding to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s request for 
a study, released the report The Responsibility to Protect advocating a human 
security agenda and humanitarian intervention when warranted (see 
http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp).    
 
There were also some practical ideas about how to increase collaboration 
between NGO/IOs, military forces and government officials.  For example, 
guides should be produced categorizing NGO/IOs by type as well as by function 
and regional areas of expertise.  Even better, stated one participant, would be a 
dynamic website that could be easily accessed and updated.  It was noted that in 
some cases this is already being done.  For example, the US Institute of Peace has 
published Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations, and 
is working on an updated version. 
 
While there was some concern over how such a guide would be used (with 
NGOs expressing concern over the idea of military officers viewing them as 
“force multipliers”), there was also a lot of support for the idea. 
 
Finally, as the day’s discussions were coming to an end, it was noted that this 
workshop itself was providing a valuable opportunity for people to come 
together to share their organizational perspectives, guidelines and goals.  As 
enhanced information sharing was a major recommendation of the day, the 
session concluded with a strong sense of focus, accomplishment and 
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Miguel Tirado, CSU Monterey Bay, Leslie Curtin, Office of the Coordinator for  
Reconstruction and Stabilization, and LTC Christopher Holschek, US Army  
Civil Affairs, discuss the different security challenges faced by various  
actors in the field of humanitarian assistance 
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On day two, workshop participants divided into breakout groups to discuss the 
following issues: 
 
• There are different conceptions of humanitarian space and 
“humanitarians.”  What are the key typologies of humanitarians?  How 
should these types relate to local community and military actors? 
 
• The inability to provide physical security because of gaps in the rule of 
law, economic rehabilitation and governance compromises humanitarian 
action.   What is the role of humanitarians and others in bridging this gap? 
 
• What is out there in terms of codes, best practices, lessons learned and 
professional capacity building?  How can these most effectively be shared 
and understood among humanitarian and military actors? 
 




Humanitarian Space: “A safe and secure environment in which to provide 
impartial assistance and protection.” 
 
Humanitarian:  “A person or organization delivering assistance to someone in 













Figure 1: Humanitarian Space:  Organizations seeking “humanitarian space” 
depend upon neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to achieve 
acceptance by local populations and security within insecure environments.  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross was presented as an organization that 









Shaping Society  
 
 
Figure 2: How, When and Why NGO/IOs Get Involved in Providing Humanitarian   
Assistance:  The different motivations that organizations have for getting involved in the delivery 



















   
 
 
Figure 3:  Types of NGO/IOs:  NGO/IOs can be categorized according to their geographical 
origin and the type of work they do, as in the above chart.  
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Presentations focused on the following topics and made the following 
suggestions: 
 
Delivery Gaps Affecting Security 
 
Planners need to take into account all elements of security, including human 
security, before intervening.  These include concern for: 
 
• Organizations delivering humanitarian assistance 
• Nations 
• Non-combatants 
• The public (e.g., the rule of law, courts, prisons, jobs) 
• Economic development 
• Political freedoms 
• Combatants 
 
There are different views of security, including physical, psychological, 
international, local, and community perceptions.  Who does this analysis?  When 
do they do it?  How do they do it?  The answers to these questions are critical to 
getting a realistic assessment of the security situation, and would be best 
addressed by teams made up of diverse regional experts who could examine 
individual environments. 
 
NGO/IOs can affect the public, economic and political security arenas and 
should be integrated into planning for interventions (including pre-, during and 
post-conflict planning and operations). 
 
Roles of NGO/IOs in Filling Security Gaps 
 
1. NGO/IOs can address force protection needs for themselves. 
 
2. NGO/IOs can advocate with interveners to create/stabilize the 
security environment for their clients/beneficiaries. 
 
3. Organizations involved in providing humanitarian assistance should 
create an ongoing Terms of Reference process, with information 
sharing and cooperation/coordination. 
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The challenge is to ascertain how NGO/IOs can work with the military to fill 
delivery gaps without losing their identity as impartial and neutral actors.  
Overcoming this challenge could help to legitimize humanitarian goals. 
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Conclusions:  Next Steps 
 
Recent trends suggest that the global community’s commitment to assistance in 
the face of complex humanitarian emergencies will remain strong.  However, the 
security threats facing aid workers will be challenging, with a strong possibility 
of things getting worse before they get better. 
 
It is critical, therefore, that those involved in delivering humanitarian aid have a 
reasonable understanding of who their counterparts are and how they operate.  
As highlighted in the workshop survey results, when and where it is feasible 
information regarding delivery operations, security threats and humanitarian 
conditions should be shared among humanitarian organizations.  Doing so will 
enhance the ability to provide for civilian populations, while making the delivery 
of assistance safer for aid workers. 
 
In closing remarks, a number of participants noted the “value of dialogue.” The 
workshop was “an end in its own right,” they asserted, as it promoted dialogue 
among many major actors involved in providing humanitarian assistance -- a 
recommendation loudly voiced in both this strategic workshop and in previous 
conferences and publications, including the recent PKSOI Carlisle Conference 
and the USIP Special Report on Provisional Reconstruction Teams, which were 
cited at the workshop.  (See Appendix). 
 
It was agreed that the workshop had been valuable, and that participants now 
had a better understanding of the diverse actors involved in humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
While the diversity of the group prevented the development of a single, uniform 
road map for future action, participants remained committed to future 
discussions on the roles of humanitarians in insecure environments. 
 
Additionally, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies agreed to expand on the list of codes of conduct 
developed at the workshop, further compiling the operational guidelines used by 
organizations involved in humanitarian assistance and posting them on its 
website (http://www.csrs-nps.org) in the near future. 
 
Finally, workshop participants made the following recommendations: 
 
• Create clear and agreed upon operational definitions (of “security,” 
“humanitarian assistance,” “humanitarian relief,” etc.). 
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• Establish a process for integrating NGO/IO input and communication 
into planning pre-/during/post-conflict. 
 
• Incorporate existing operational guidelines for humanitarian assistance 
(such as those developed by UNOCHA) into DoD operations. 
 
• Create a regular forum for understanding how various actors operate in 
similar environments, and mechanisms for capturing “institutional 
memories” and organizational changes. 
 
• Create an on-line library for cataloging NGOs, including their operational 
guidelines, activities and expertise. 
 
• Continue interactions among the various actors, including dialogue and 
possible joint training exercises. 
 




Appendix I:  Workshop Agenda 
 
Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments 
 
United States Institute of Peace 
1200 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036 
 
AGENDA  
Thursday, January 13, 2005 
9-9:30 Welcome and Introductions (Charla Britt, Miguel Tirado, Matt 
Vaccaro, Roy Williams) 
 
9:30-10:15     Analysis of Survey Results (led by Karen Guttieri and Miguel  
                          Tirado) 
 
10:15-10:45     Coffee Break 
  
10:45-12      Discussion: “Survey Results” (facilitated by Peter Walker) 
 
12-1       Working Lunch, Discussion Continues 
 
1-3 Discussion Continues 
 
3-3:30       Coffee Break 
 
3:30-4:30           Summary of Day’s Discussion and Structure of Day Two  
     (Peter Walker) 
 
Friday, January 14, 2005 
9-9:45              Review Day One and Goals of Day Two (Peter Walker) 
 
9:45-10      Coffee Break 
 
10-11:30             Breakout Groups to Draft Short Statements on Topics to be   
                           Included in Statement of Conference Conclusions 
 
11:30-1       Finalize Statement of Conference Conclusions in Plenary 
 
The Professional Training Program of the United States Institute of Peace  
expresses its appreciation to The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation  
for its support of this meeting. 
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Appendix II:  Workshop Survey 
 
 
This is a preliminary survey to identify issues and needs to be addressed at the 
upcoming workgroup meeting planned for January. 
 
1. What is your position in your organization? 
 
      _______________________________________ 
 
2. Describe some of the particularly new or different challenges your 
organization faces in any post-conflict field operation involving multiple 
actors. 
 
3. How would you characterize the status of your organization’s overall 
relationship with each of the following major actors?  Please identify with 
a check where you are on the following chart using the 6 levels of 
interaction below. 
 
• Awareness:  cognizant of the other’s presence in your field of 
operations 
• Familiarity:  knowledgeable of the other’s activities and 
methods of operation 
• Boundary setting: seek to mutually clarify parameters of 
operation to avoid disruption of one another’s mission 
• Cooperation: mutual accommodation for separate missions 
including information exchange 
• Collaboration: working in distinct operating teams toward a 
common outcome based on  a shared situational understanding 
• Partnership: mixing operational units together to work toward a 
common goal 
 
















Awareness       
Familiarity       
Boundary 
setting 
      
Cooperation       
Collaboration       
Partnership       
 
4. Please identify with an asterisk (*) on the above chart where you would 
like that relationship to be for each actor. 
 
5.   How would you characterize the quality of your organization’s overall 
relationship with each of the following major actors?  Please indicate with 
a number from 1 to 5 what the quality of your interaction is, with   1 being 















       
 
 
6. Which of the following descriptors apply to your organization?             




c. Emergency relief 
d. Rehabilitation 
e. Reconstruction 
f. Primarily privately funded 
g. Primarily government funded 
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7.  What, in your mind, are the most urgent points of mutual concern with 




__Security for personnel 
__Competition for local labor / transport / housing 
__Local public awareness 
__Sectoral convergence (e.g., health, water sanitation, education) 
__Other______________ 
 
8.   To what extent do you observe host communities in post-conflict 
environments have difficulty distinguishing your identity and mission 
from those of the other major foreign actors in their country? 
 
                  Never       Seldom       Sometimes      Often     Consistently 
                      1                2                   3                  4                 5 
 
9.   If so, what effect will your response to the previous question have on the 
management approach to your operations in the country?  
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Appendix III:  Dr. Karen Guttieri’s Survey Summary: 




Naval Postgraduate School 
Guttieri@nps.edu 
 
Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments:  Response to a Survey 
 
…when the profession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing tradition 
of scientific practice – then begin the extraordinary investigations that lead the profession 
at last to a new set of commitments, a new basis for the practice of science. 
 
                                                 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
 
A paradigm shift is taking place in the world of humanitarians.  It is evident in 
the political contest over a very basic concept of humanitarian space.  As defined 
by the European Commission’s Directorate for Humanitarian Aid, 
“humanitarian space” means “the access and freedom for humanitarian 
organisations to assess and meet humanitarian needs.”  Humanitarian principles, 
including humanity (preserving the humanitarian nature of operations), 
independence from political and military actors, impartiality, neutrality and non-
discrimination, are essential to humanitarian actors.  However, at least since 
agents of violence in African refugee camps exploited humanitarian impulses in 
the 1990s, challenges to these principles have arisen in humanitarian practice.  
Compromised neutrality, seemingly regardless of humanitarian intentions and 
stemming from simply being “outsiders,” changes relationships with 
communities, political and military actors, and degrades physical security.  A 
humanitarian paradigm shift, as with changes in the practice of science described 
by Kuhn, first involves recognition of anomalies and second, new investigations 
upon which to build a new basis for practice.  This is the point of departure for 
our inquiry. 
 
It is clear today that the theoretical space that insulates aid workers is physically 
increasingly unsafe.  In 2003, there were more fatal attacks on humanitarian 
workers than previously recorded.2  Terrorist attacks in recent years increasingly 
                                                 
1 According to World Vision data derived from various reports (Dennis Klug, UN Security coordinator), 
most attack fatalities in the period 1997-2003 resulted from ambush (127) and murder (72).  Car/truck 
bombing (26), landmines (25), anti-aircraft attack (24), and aerial bombardment (14) were also significant.  
There were more than 70 violent deaths in 2003, doubling the number in 2002.  More than half of the 
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targeted United Nations and non-governmental organizations.  The destruction 
in Iraq of the UN Headquarters in August 2003, including the death of Special 
Representative Sergio de Mello, shocked the world.  Gil Loscher was in de 
Mello’s office at the time of the explosion and lost two legs and friends in the 
blast.  He wrote later of the difficult position of the UN and called for a clear 
separation of military and humanitarian activity.3  In Afghanistan in June 2004, 
the murder of five Medicin Sans Frontieres personnel caused MSF to withdraw 
after more than 24 years of service there.  MSF departed with a closing salvo 
against the military for blurring the boundaries of humanitarian space by 
directly delivering aid.  The brutal kidnapping in October 2004 and eventual 
murder of Margaret Hassan, Director of CARE International Iraq, was 
particularly astonishing because she had long lived among and cared for the 
Iraqi people.  In response, Peter Walker of the Feinstein International Famine 
Center at Tufts University called for a reinvention of humanitarianism.  Walker 
calls for a global movement that articulates “a value set and doctrine that 
resonates across all cultures” at the same time he urges a more localized 
approach that puts local agencies out front.4 
 
The paradigm of security for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) differs 
from that of military and corporate approaches.  If the military approach to force 
protection is primarily deterrence, and the corporate approach is protection (for 
example, hiring bodyguards), the NGO approach has been characterized by 
acceptance.  This model, writes one participant in our workshop, may not be 
holding as “NGOs have become prime targets due to their proximity to the 
conflict.”  These organizations have customarily accepted the risk associated 
with their work, but now question whether the security provided by regional 
governments is sufficient.  There is debate today about what is an acceptable 
level of risk, with different organizations setting different thresholds.5  
                                                                                                                                                 
victims are local (not expatriate) staff.  Angola (58), Afghanistan (36) and Iraq (32) led the list of the 
highest number of aid workers killed in this period.  This data needs more investigation:  does it include 
UN workers?  Is it important to control for the level of crime and, if so, how does one account for it?  If 
humanitarian aid is a growth industry, how does one control for the number of violent deaths in relation to 
a growing number of aid workers? 
 
2 Gil Loscher, “An Idea Lost in the Rubble,” The New York Times August 20, 2004. 
3 Peter Walker, “Hassan Murder Engenders Soul-searching,” AlertNet December 13, 2004.  Tanja Hohe 
and Jarat Chopra similarly argue for giving local voices more influence in the development of the state, 
even allowing for indigenous paradigms to linger alongside modern forms, in “Participatory Intervention,” 
Global Governance 10, no. 3 (2004).  [Available online at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/109847/SD_Communication/epublish/zip_files/tslg/pdf/intervention.pdf.] 
4 World Vision has developed The World Vision Reporter to gather information from field security officers 
in order to assign risk scores to areas of operation.  This system rates countries as red, yellow or green.  
When Colombia was reported as green, in contrast to what the head office knows to be true, it became 
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Meanwhile, humanitarian agencies have conducted research and developed 
programs to address the problem of safety for their personnel.6 
 
Interaction between humanitarians and militaries had deepened over the last 
decade to include formalized exchanges, coordination, and institutional 
development of centers and institutes. Indeed, an emergent consensus on 
coherence – coordination of intervention and humanitarian actions – was 
emerging by the turn of the millennium.  The United Nations became a fulcrum 
for external assistance in its many forms, in an implicit division of labor among 
military peacekeepers and civilian government and non-government agencies.  
However, the cohesiveness of the relationship and possibility for advancement 
appear doubtful in the wake of interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.7 Although 
civil-military relations are vital to effective post-conflict transitions, these 




In preparation for our working session on humanitarian roles in dangerous 
environments, we constructed a survey of NGO, government, military, 
international and academic professionals who would participate.  This survey 
seeks to identify and map the relationships among various stakeholders in relief 
and reconstruction scenarios, account for effects of recent experience on these 
relationships, and better understand the organizational approaches of 
humanitarian agencies to the challenges of security.  This small survey was not 
intended as a scientific instrument, but as a point of departure for discussion 
among an elite group of experienced practitioners.  Of the 22 surveys distributed, 
we received 20 responses. 
 
We asked, “What are the most urgent points of concern with other organizations 
in post-conflict and relief settings?”  Three challenges were in the top of nearly 
every list: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
obvious that some field workers become acclimated to danger.  Another challenge to objective reporting is 
donor refusal to fund dangerous environments, making staff reluctant to admit dangers or to pull out. 
Alternatively, in some cases local workers have felt the need to move even when head office does not 
declare a need to move, as happened in Sierra Leone. 
5  Some examples from a large and growing literature include the following:  European Commission 
Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) Report on Security of Humanitarian Personnel: 
Standards and Practices for the Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Advocacy for Humanitarian 
Space 2004; Generic Security Guide and Security Training Directory; “Workshop on Common Operational 
Guidelines, Institute for Defense Analysis” 25 October 2001. 
6  Andjela Jurisic, The Liaison 2004.   
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1. Security for personnel 
2. Information sharing 
3. Local public awareness 
 
Staff recruiting and training; donor issues, in particular, US Government 
expectations; program monitoring and evaluation; and logistical and 
communication barriers to cooperation were also prominently mentioned. 
 
When we asked about new or different challenges in the field, the threat of 
indiscriminate attack, including abduction and assassination, was frequently 
identified.  It is noteworthy that information sharing is a prominent concern.  
One participant remarked that “better clarity and more systematic and focused 
effort to communicate purpose by all organizations operating in an emergency 
can help improve collaboration without abrogating the organization’s key 
principles or protocols.”  Is there a linkage between interoperability and 
improved security?  It appears from the responses that NGO workers are 
encountering the military more intimately than desired, while the military finds 
itself expected to do things it is unprepared for.  Many respondents noted the 
involvement of more types of actors in “nation building” as new or different.  
Finally, there was much concern about a new or different challenge of “blurring 
lines” between humanitarian actors on the one hand and the political and 
military on the other.  The emphasis on local public awareness when asked about 
prominent concerns speaks to the problem of differentiation, but may also 
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In seeking to understand the relationships, we asked about current level of 
interaction with other types of actors and desired level of interaction. These 
appear as a hierarchical range of interaction as follows: 
 
 
Type of Interaction Description 
Conflictive  Unproductive disputes 
Dismissive  The other party or actor discounts your  
 role 
Awareness  Cognizant of each other’s presence in field 
Familiarity  Knowledgeable of the other’s activities and
 methods 
Boundary setting  Mutually clarify parameters of operation 
to  
 avoid disruption of one another’s mission 
Cooperative  Mutual accommodation for separate  
 missions including  information exchange 
Collaborative  Distinct operating teams / work towards  
 common outcome based on shared  
 situational understanding 
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We coded 9 of our respondents as non-governmental. Separately, we asked 




With Whom Interaction [desired] Quality 
IO Collaborative-partnership High 
Local NGO Cooperative High 
Int’l NGO Cooperative 
[seek collaborative] 
Medium 
Local Authorities Boundary setting 
[often seek cooperation] 
Medium 





In contrast, US Government and Military responses were more sanguine, as 
follows: 
 
US Government and Military Relationships 
 
With Whom Interaction [desired] Quality 
IO Cooperative-Partnership Medium-High 
Local NGO Cooperative Medium 
Int’l NGO Cooperative Medium-Low 
Local Authorities Cooperative Medium 
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Many NGO responses discussed how very critical host country perceptions are 
in their work.  “Without strong local bonds and buy-in from the community our 
work is not tenable,” wrote one participant. “Security is a major concern when 
perception is incorrect,” wrote another.  One participant wrote, “The military is 
dismissive of NGOs and delving ever deeper into humanitarian programming. 
The US Government is obsessed with “owning” the NGOs through rhetoric 
(“force multipliers”), actions (contracts vs. grants), and sanctions (prohibiting 
even emergency humanitarian assistance through OFAC licensing).”  For its part, 
the US Department of Defense describes desire to transition as quickly as 
possible from humanitarian operations, so must sustain good relations with 
humanitarian organizations.  For the US DOD, host nation perceptions are also 
critical, as the DOD only participates “with the approval of host nation 
authorities.”  Civilian government agencies likewise seek to “work closely with 
and empower if possible local communities.”  The need to manage tension 
among external agents of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping was noted 
by many:  “When we begin to perceive our work as a competition for precious 
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Appendix IV:  Workshop Participants 
 
1. COL John Agoglia, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 
Institute 
2. George Biddle, International Rescue Committee 
3. Charla Britt, Monterey Institute of International Studies 
4. Scott Busby, State Department Bureau of Population Refugees and 
    Migration 
5. John Christiansen, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies,    
      Naval Postgraduate School 
6. Leslie Curtin, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization 
7. Beth DeGrasse, United States Institute of Peace 
8. Michael Dziedzic, United States Institute of Peace 
9. Gene Dewey, State Department Bureau of Pop. Refugees and Migration 
10. Karen Guttieri, Naval Postgraduate School 
11. Todd Harvey, Office of the Secretary of Defense:  
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 
12. LTC Christopher Holschek, US Army Civil Affairs 
13. Noor Kirdar, United States Institute of Peace 
14. Lana Lynn, Consultant on Humanitarian Affairs 
15. Gerard McHugh, Conflict Dynamics/Save the Children UK 
16. Debbie Merrill, Office of US Congressman Sam Farr 
17. Michael Neuman, Medicins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) 
18. Robert Perito, United States Institute of Peace 
19. Kathryn Poethig, California State University, Monterey Bay 
20. Anne Richard, International Rescue Committee 
21. Finn Ruda, International Committee of the Red Cross 
22. Michael Seidl, United States Institute of Peace 
23. Julia Taft, UN Development Program 
24. Miguel Tirado, California State University, Monterey Bay 
25. Nicholas Tomb, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies,                              
Naval Postgraduate School 
26. Stephen Tomlin, International Medical Corps 
27. Matthew Vaccaro, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies,                              
Naval Postgraduate School 
28. Ann Vaughan, Office of US Congressman Sam Farr 
29. Peter Walker, Tufts University (Facilitator) 
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Appendix V:  Co-Sponsoring Organizations 
 
California State University, Monterey Bay 
 
California State University, Monterey Bay (CSUMB) is a comprehensive state 
university that values service through high quality education. The university is 
distinctive in serving the diverse people of California, especially the working 
class and historically undereducated and low-income populations. It features an 
enriched living and learning environment and year-round operation.  
The identity of the university is framed by substantive commitment to 
multilingual, multicultural, gender-equitable learning. The university is a 
collaborative intellectual community distinguished by partnerships with existing 
institutions, both public and private; cooperative agreements that enable 
students, faculty, and staff to cross institutional boundaries for innovative 
instruction; broadly defined scholarly and creative activity; and coordinated 
community service. 
 
Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies 
 
The Naval Postgraduate School created the Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) in September 2004.  The new Center is dedicated 
to building more effective responses to failing states and ungoverned spaces. 
 
The Center provides short- and long-term graduate education, creates 
knowledge through research and conducts educational outreach in the broad 
functional areas of stability and reconstruction. 
 
The best learning in this field occurs when the curriculum is multidisciplinary 
and interactive among a diverse student mix.  The programs of CSRS incorporate 
students from the complete range of actors involved in these activities, including 
US and foreign military officers, US and foreign government civilians and 
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Center for Humanitarian Cooperation 
 
The Center for Humanitarian Cooperation, a not-for-profit organization, was 
created to assist the international humanitarian community in developing 
models for greater cooperation.  
 
The Center consists of a devoted and experienced group of professionals. It 
serves as a neutral party to foster functional cooperation among the growing 
group of organizations concerned with humanitarian issues. 
 
 
International Medical Corps 
 
The International Medical Corps is a global humanitarian nonprofit organization 
dedicated to saving lives and relieving suffering through health care training and 
relief and development programs.  
 
Established in 1984 by volunteer doctors and nurses, IMC is a private, voluntary, 
nonpolitical, nonsectarian organization.  Its mission is to improve the quality of 
life through health interventions and related activities that build local capacity in 
areas worldwide where few organizations dare to serve.  By offering training and 
health care to local populations and medical assistance to people at highest risk, 
and with the flexibility to respond rapidly to emergency situations, IMC 




International Rescue Committee 
 
Founded in 1933, the International Rescue Committee is a world leader in relief, 
rehabilitation, protection, post-conflict development, resettlement services and 
advocacy for those uprooted or affected by violent conflict and oppression. 
At work in 25 countries, the IRC delivers lifesaving aid in emergencies; rebuilds 
shattered communities; cares for war-traumatized children; rehabilitates health 
care, water and sanitation systems; reunites separated families; restores lost 
livelihoods; establishes schools; trains teachers; strengthens the capacity of local 
organizations; and supports civil society and good-governance initiatives. 
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For refugees afforded sanctuary in the United States, IRC offices across the 
country provide a range of assistance aimed at helping new arrivals get settled, 
adjust, and acquire the skills to become self sufficient. 
Committed to restoring dignity and self-reliance, the IRC is a global symbol of 
hope and renewal for those who have taken flight in search of freedom. 
 
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
With approximately 750 students and 70 full-time resident faculty, the Institute is 
a close-knit, welcoming community.  Faculty and staff are readily available to 
meet with students, and students themselves are eager to share their experiences.  
Most students and faculty have studied or worked abroad and are receptive to 
new people and new views.  Amidst the stunning physical beauty of the central 
California coast, this atmosphere of openness and active connection with the 
environment is a dimension of the Monterey experience that remains with 
Institute graduates for many years. 
Consisting of four separate but interconnected graduate schools, the Institute 
provides a practical curriculum with particular emphasis on languages and 
cross-cultural communication designed to prepare students for professional 
careers in the fields of their choosing. 
 
United States Institute of Peace  
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal 
institution created by Congress to promote the prevention, management and 
peaceful resolution of international conflicts. 
Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an 
array of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training, 
education programs from high school through graduate school, conferences and 
workshops, library services and publications.   The Institute's Board of Directors 
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              Appendix VI:  US Institute of Peace Special Report: 
Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations 
Recommendations 
 
In April 2004 the United States Institute of Peace published a Special Report 
examining civilian capacity in US stability operations.  The report examined the 
requirements for the US Government to develop a civilian capacity to deploy 
police, judges and corrections officials to peace and stability operations.  
Ambassador Robert Gelbard, former Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Ambassador Robert Oakley, former 
State Department Coordinator for Counter-terrorism; and General Anthony 
Zinni, former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, served as advisors 
for the report. 
The report was written by Robert Perito, Special Advisor to the Rule of Law 
Program; Michael Dziedzic, a Program Officer in the Institute's Research and 
Studies Program and the strategic planner who drafted the Mission 
Implementation Plan for the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and the 
Standards for Kosovo for the UN Mission in Kosovo; and Beth C. DeGrasse, 
Executive Director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. 
 
The following recommendations from the USIP Special Report were reported at 
the “Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments” workshop: 
 
• There is a need to promote a better understanding of humanitarian 
providers’ norms and imperatives within the military community. 
 
• We need to establish a process for inputting the humanitarian 
community’s feedback to update military doctrine/training. 
 
• Major IOs and NGOs need to establish liaisons in regional Command 
headquarters prior to military operations. 
 
• The military should adapt classification procedures for information 
sharing with IOs and NGOs. 
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Appendix VII:  US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 
Coordination Conference, December 13 – 14, 2004 Recommendations 
 
On December 13 - 14, 2004, the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability 
Operations Institute (USAPKSOI), the State Department’s Office of 
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP) hosted a stability operations symposium designed to enable collective 
solutions to the challenges confronting the United States Government’s stability 
operations.   
 
The event was held at the Center for Strategic Leadership at the US Army War 
College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.  The conference’s theme “Where We 
Are and the Road Ahead,” provided a meaningful opportunity for agencies and 
organizations involved in stability operations to share experiences and lessons 
learned, and to inform other conference participants of their capabilities and 
current and planned activities.   
 
The following findings and recommendations from the PKSOI conference were 
reported at the “Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments” workshop: 
 
• A glossary of common key terms is essential for successful 
understanding, collaboration and information sharing among 
members of the stability operations community. 
• Interagency participation in the military’s stability operations planning 
is required, and a useful template and cooperative mechanism that 
would improve interagency planning should be developed. 
• Additionally, increased interagency and NGO/IO participation must 
become standard in the combatant commands’ training and exercises. 
• Ownership of and local participation in the crisis response strategy 
must be a part of any stabilization and reconstruction solution. 
• More attention must be devoted to measuring success in stability 
operations, and a need exists for a system of metrics to assist in the 
evaluation and validation of reconstruction and stabilization missions. 
• A central venue for collection, integration and dissemination of policy, 
planning and operational lessons learned related to post-conflict 
operations should be created. 
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Appendix VIII:  Day Two Working Group Presentation 




1. European Commission on Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) Guidelines 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/index_en.htm) 
 
2. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
On-site Coordination Office Guidelines 
(www.reliefweb.int/symposium/bp_statement.html) 
 
3. UN Best Practices website 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/) 
 
4. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations: 
In process of developing UN-centric guidelines 
 
5. Oslo Plus (Guidelines) 
(http://ochaonline.un.org/GetBin.asp?DocID=426) 
 






1. Military Doctrine (Inconsistent and Ad-hoc) 






1. “Sphere” codes (minimal levels of care) 
(http://www.sphereproject.org/links.htm) 
 
a. Define the role and minimal level of competence desired of 
agencies involved in humanitarian assistance 
 
b. Standards by sector 
 




2. French NGO Equivalent  (Project Compass) 
 
3. Codes of Conduct 
a. US Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and 
Migration: Requirements for Grantees (created in Africa in   
early 2000s) 
 
b. International Rescue Committee Code of Conduct for Staff    
 
c. IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) includes: 
i. Major UN agencies 
ii. ICRC 
iii. NGO coalitions 
4. Safety 
a. IMC/World Vision, etc. 
 
b. InterAction DVD on security 
 
c. European NGOs 
i. Register of Engineers 
1. Generic training package for NGOs 
 
d. Guidelines on use of armed escorts 
 
e. Evacuation protocols 
 
f. Hostage taking 
 
